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== Information and statements ==
=== Headline information that PGP- and S/MIME-encrypted emails are no longer secure ===
'''The last few days have seen headlines saying that PGP and S/MIME encrypted emails are no longer secure. This raises the question of whether this also applies to the TrutzBox.'''
First, a brief explanation of how attackers can read traditional PGP or S/MIME encrypted emails: The prerequisite is that the attacker can intercept and manipulate the encrypted e-mail during transmission. Since with conventional e-mail transmission at least both the sender's and the recipient's e-mail provider are able to do this, this prerequisite is always met.
The attacker then inserts a link into the encrypted e-mail that is retrieved by the e-mail client and thereby sends the e-mail to the attacker after decryption. Details about this attack scenario here: https://www.efail.de/
'''How does e-mail work with TrutzBox?'''
The TrutzBox is a server that can also send and receive secure e-mails. When designing the TrutzBox, we attached great importance to the fact that communication via the TrutzBox is not only easier to use, but also offers even more privacy than PGP-encrypted e-mails. This was achieved by TrutzBoxes exchanging their e-mails via Tor hidden services. In contrast to PGP-encrypted e-mails, the TrutzBox offers the following advantages if both sender and recipient have a TrutzBox:
*the key management is fully automatic. The user never comes into contact with any keys. Unlike PGP-encrypted emails, which require manual key management on all devices in use.
*no extension is necessary on the end devices (e-mail clients). All email clients can still be used in their full functionality.
*an attacker who can monitor Internet communication cannot see that an e-mail is being exchanged here, nor which IP addresses are communicating here. With PGP-encrypted emails, anyone who has access to the mail servers or Internet connections can read all meta data of the mail.
*for security reasons the TrutzBox always encrypts e-mails additionally with PGP
*since the TrutzBoxes exchange e-mails via the Tor network and there is no "e-mail provider" in between, no third party can change the e-mail on the move.
As a result of this last point: if the communication partner also has a TrutzBox, the e-mail cannot be manipulated while on the move and is safe from this attack,
These same features are also used by the chat function of the TrutzBox.
Due to this increased security against PGP, the TrutzBox is also used by journalists, doctors, lawyers... which require special protection.
If the communication partner does not have a TrutzBox, the TrutzBox can also send and receive PGP-encrypted e-mails via normal mail servers and automatically encrypt and decrypt them. In this case, the email client retrieves the decrypted email from its TrutzBox.
But since in this case the PGP-encrypted mail is exchanged with a normal e-mail account, it can be manipulated on the way. The TrutzBox decrypts the mail correctly and does not send any mail to the attacker, but if the e-mail program on the client is configured to load references from the e-mail, then the attacker would also receive the mail from the e-mail client.
If, as in this attack, the mail was tampered with on the way, the TrutzBox would detect this, however, since it cannot verify the signature and would mark the mail accordingly.
However, it is quite easy to fend off this attack. To do this, simply deactivate automatic reloading in the e-mail program.
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